


INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

ICIS-P1/497

June 20, 1977



Honorable Stansfield Turner  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Admiral Turner:

Pursuant to the responsibilities assigned by the Attorney General, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) has revised and brought up to date its report which establishes the security measures applicable to Communist visitors to the United States. The revised report, entitled "Security Measures Applicable to Nationals of Communist-controlled Countries Entering the U.S. as Nonimmigrant Aliens", was unanimously approved by the ICIS on May 25, 1977.

A copy of the revised report is enclosed, and it is requested that your Agency implement, as appropriate, the recommendations on pages 2-9.

There is a security risk involved in the admission of nationals of Communist-controlled countries into the United States, regardless of the announced purpose of their visit. Therefore, maximum efforts should be made to implement effectively the security procedures recommended in the enclosed report.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert L. Keuch".

Robert L. Keuch  
Acting Chairman  
Interdepartmental Committee  
on Internal Security

Enclosure

When enclosure is removed,  
this letter becomes  
UNCLASSIFIED.

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

REPORT BY  
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY  
CONCERNING  
SECURITY MEASURES APPLICABLE TO NATIONALS OF  
COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED COUNTRIES ENTERING THE  
U.S. AS NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS

May 25, 1977

(This is a revision of the report of June 5, 1969)

CLASSIFIED BY R.L. Keuch - D.A.A.G.  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5-B (3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

REPORT BY  
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY  
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A. PROBLEM

To review existing procedures and recommend internal security safeguards to be applied to meet the internal security threat which may be presented by the entry into the United States of nationals of Communist-controlled countries.\*

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\* The procedures in this report should be considered applicable to nationals of Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Laos, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Peoples Republic of China, Poland, Romania, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, and the occupied city of East Berlin.

With respect to the Poles, ICIS advised the Department of State, by letter dated January 20, 1959, that it had no objection to the Department of State's proposal to exempt certain Polish visa applicants from the name check requirements of Confidential Appendix A 22 CFR 41.90, Note 6, when urgency is a consideration in the granting of a visa and it is in the national interest.

With regard to the screening provisions for the admission of Yugoslavian nationals to the United States, ICIS advised the Department of State, by letter dated October 16, 1956, that it interposed no objection to the Department of State's proposal to drop the mandatory requirement for an Advisory Opinion (which includes name checks with FBI and CIA) with respect to Yugoslav aliens when the only reason for it is that the alien bears a Yugoslav passport.

The applicability of the recommendations herein to other Communist-controlled countries will be considered as required.

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B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon its study of this problem, the Committee recommends that the following procedures be applied to all nonimmigrant visa applicants who are nationals of Communist-controlled countries.

I. Any agency of the United States Government which intends to take action designed to bring nationals of Communist-controlled countries to the United States, regardless of purpose, should, before doing so, notify the Departments of State (Visa Office and appropriate country offices) and Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation) of the project, including such details as:

- (a) Names, dates and places of birth and itineraries of any prospective visitors;
- (b) Arrangements to be made for monitoring the movements and actions of such persons while in the United States;
- (c) Expression of views on whether the prospective visit is consistent with national policy; and,
- (d) Comment on whether reciprocity is being received.

II. Any government agency which is approached by a private sponsor, individual or corporate, in regard to plans to bring visitors or other nonimmigrants to the United States from Communist-controlled countries, whether the request be for visas or for some approval (e.g., approval of a program by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of State, or approval of

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an I-129B petition by INS) essential to accomplishment of the scheme, shall, where indicated, take appropriate steps to ascertain whether there exists adverse security information against the sponsor. If such information is developed, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Visa Office, and the appropriate government agencies shall be promptly advised thereof. The government agency shall ask the sponsor to submit to the Visa Office and appropriate country offices lists of participants from Communist-controlled countries with dates and places of birth and itineraries at least 14 days before the aliens' estimated time of arrival.

III. Any government agency which is contacted by an individual or corporate entity planning to receive a commercial visitor shall ask the sponsor to submit lists of visitors from Communist-controlled countries of Europe (except Yugoslavia), with dates and places of birth, and names and locations of companies to be visited to the Visa Office and appropriate country offices. This category shall also include staffs of economic organizations in the U.S., inspectors and trainees coming to American firms in accordance with contract provisions, temporary visitors coming for consultations of a commercial nature with a United States Government agency or an American firm, and persons coming to meetings of a commercial-technical, as opposed to a scientific, nature. For Soviet commercial visitors the lists required shall be submitted at least 14 days before the aliens' estimated time of arrival. For commercial visitors from Eastern European countries, visas may be issued on a postcheck basis. (See Appendix 1.)

IV. All nationals of Communist-controlled countries who are applicants for nonimmigrant visas shall be the subject of a check of files and records available to the consular officer at the post where the application is

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made. As a general policy, the granting of visas to previously identified Soviet Bloc intelligence services personnel will not be authorized. In extraordinary cases where State can establish to the satisfaction of the Department of Justice that exclusion would adversely affect U.S. interests, a visa may be issued as an exception to general policy.\* The following additional steps shall be taken in the cases indicated:

PRIOR TO VISA ISSUANCE\*\*

1. Name Checks

(a) FBI and CIA files shall be checked on all Communist-controlled country nationals, except tourists (B-2 visas) otherwise admissible from Poland, Romania, and Hungary. This requirement may be waived in the case of aliens who seek to enter the United States solely in continuous and immediate transit or where the applicant is over eighty or under sixteen years of age.

(b) FBI and CIA files shall be checked in all 212(d)(3)(A) waiver cases for 212(a)(28) ineligibility.

2. Advisory Opinions

An Advisory Opinion must be obtained from the Department of State

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\* The Department of State dissents.  
(See Appendix 2.)

\*\* Where urgency is a consideration and prompt issuance is in the national interest, visas may be issued on a postcheck basis.

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before a visa is issued to nationals of Communist-controlled countries, sixteen years of age or older, who are:

- (a) Soviet crewmen applying for individual visas;
- (b) holders of Albanian, Cambodian, Cuban, Laotian, North Korean, Outer Mongolian, Peoples Republic of China, or Vietnamese travel documents;
- (c) coming to the United States under the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Program, or as Soviet commercial visitors;
- (d) coming to the United States as domestic servants of Foreign Service personnel on home leave or consultation;
- (e) applicants for A, G, C-3 and B-1 (in lieu of A) visas EXCEPT:
  - (1) heads of state, ambassadors and public ministers and their immediate families;
  - (2) career diplomatic couriers;
  - (3) Yugoslav nationals;
  - (4) nationals of Eastern Europe (except Albania) and the GDR assigned to their embassies or Branch Offices thereof (Cultural, Trade and Information) or consulates, and members of their

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immediate families;

(5) Soviet nationals assigned to the Soviet Embassy and members of their immediate families;

(6) in the case of applicants on whom a favorable advisory opinion had been obtained within the preceding six months;

(7) C-3 visa applicants proceeding through the United States on business of the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland or Romania, and members of their immediate families;

(8) where delay in issuance would result in embarrassment to the United States.

AT TIME OF VISA ISSUANCE

1. Photograph Requirement

Every nonimmigrant visa applicant holding a travel document issued by a Communist-controlled country, shall be required to submit two photographs. One photograph and a copy of the visa application shall be forwarded promptly to Washington for immediate transmission to the FBI. This procedure may be waived on subsequent applications by an official for whom a photograph has been provided within the past three years; for heads of state, deputy heads of state, ambassadors, ministers, members of the immediate

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family of such persons, and career diplomatic couriers.

2. Limitation of Port of Entry  
Into United States

Bearerers of A, C-3, G and B-1 (in lieu of A) visas from Communist-controlled countries shall be limited to specified ports of entry except for the PRC, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (See Appendix 3). When some overriding consideration so dictates, the limitation may be waived by the Department of State on an individual case basis. The Department of State shall immediately inform a senior officer of the INS of such waivers so that appropriate arrangements and notifications can be carried out.

3. Crew List Visas

FBI and CIA files shall be checked on a post-issuance basis seven days before arrival for all nationals of Communist-controlled countries (except Yugoslavia) who are included in a crew list visa. The INS and Coast Guard shall be notified of the identity of all such nationals and of the results of these name checks.

ACTION BY INS UPON APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION

1. At Port of Entry

Copies of orders authorizing admission of ineligible nonimmigrants from Communist-controlled countries shall be furnished the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Consular Officer or

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the Visa Office. The port of entry shall immediately notify the FBI upon the admission of every holder of Communist travel documents. The Form I-94, Arrival-Departure Record, issued the traveler shall be noted to show limitations as to period of authorized stay. Unsponsored visitors from Communist-controlled countries, whose admission has been authorized under Section 212(d)(3), are limited to an initial admission period not to exceed six months. Form I-94 shall also be noted to show that admission in such case was authorized pursuant to Section 212(d)(3) and the section of law under which inadmissible.

2. After Admission to the United States

All Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Program (SPLEX) aliens and Soviet and Eastern European commercial visitors are required to have prior approval from the Department of State when any change in itinerary is desired. INS shall not authorize any deviation from itinerary or extension of stay without prior recommendation from the Department of State.

Other visitors from Communist-controlled countries, whose admission has been authorized under Section 212(d)(3) and whose itinerary is a condition of admission, are required to obtain approval from the District Director of the district in which they are temporarily residing before making a change in the authorized itinerary, including any extension of stay. Extension of stay in such cases is limited to six months. Extensions will not be authorized for holders of B-2 visas.

Upon departure from the United States, the INS controls are cleared. If verification of departure is not received within a reasonable period after the departure date, INS initiates action to locate the alien.

C. BACKGROUND

The entry into the United States, and sojourn here, of nonimmigrant nationals of Communist-controlled countries, raises an internal security problem which can be met in several ways.

One method is to screen each applicant for a visa in an endeavor to weed out and reject those individuals who, by their presence in the United States, could be a threat to the security of this nation.

Another method is to so restrict, monitor and delimit the travel and activities of possibly dangerous persons while in the United States that opportunity to cause harm to our internal security is confined within acceptable limits.

From its review the Committee believes that:

- (a) Communist-controlled governments must be assumed to have excellent facilities and techniques for the fabrication of complete false identities for their agents. There is, therefore, no assurance that any governmental screening method now available to the United States can detect such agents.
- (b) It would be a dangerous policy to place reliance entirely upon one method or technique to minimize or neutralize the internal security

threat posed by these visitors.

(c) There is a continuing trend to ease the controls and facilitate travel between the United States and Communist-controlled countries, because of official U.S. policy focused on improving U.S. relations with these countries and enhancing contacts in a broad spectrum of fields in which the U.S. is engaged with them.

D. DISCUSSION

1. Soviet and Eastern European  
Exchanges Visitors (SPLEX)

On September 24, 1957, the ICIS approved minimum security requirements for use in implementing Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges policy. These requirements were amended and brought up-to-date on March 27, 1961, and June 5, 1969. These safeguards would be applied to future visits by exchange personnel from Communist-controlled countries, whether holding official or nonofficial passports. The criteria covered visitors admitted on an individual or group basis, the use of sponsors, monitors, tour guides, and interpreters, and the policy regarding itinerary.

By memorandum dated July 10, 1964, the Attorney General directed that all entries, visits and activities in the United States of groups from Communist-controlled nations in Eastern Europe should take place under appropriate internal security safeguards approved by the ICIS.

An understanding between the Departments of State and Justice concerning aliens visiting the United States under the exchanges program authorized by NSC 5607 was revised and rewritten in 1968 and was further revised for this report to include, inter alia, a new category on commercial visitors (See Appendix 4). This paper divides alien visitors from the USSR and Eastern European countries (except Yugoslavia) into six categories and sets up procedures and policies to be followed by State and Justice in handling these individuals during their sojourn in the United States. The six categories are:

- (a) Delegations under the exchange programs;
- (b) Persons attending meetings sponsored by the United States;
- (c) Students and others carrying out long term studies;
- (d) Individuals and groups coming for commercial and business reasons;
- (e) Individuals and groups coming as tourists;
- (f) Other nonimmigrant categories.

Many applicants for nonimmigrant visas, who are documented as nationals of Communist-controlled countries, are found to be ineligible for visas and inadmissible to the United States because of membership in a Communist organization or an organization affiliated with the Communist Party.

Authority to grant a waiver under Section 212 (d) (3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is not exercised in the case of a visitor from a Communist-controlled country until the alien's proposed itinerary is known.

Name checks are completed in all 212(d) (3)(A) waiver cases involving ineligibility under 212(a)(28). Every effort is made to complete these checks prior to issuance of the visa. In exceptional cases when all prescribed name checks have not been completed and if the timely admission of a visitor or group of visitors under the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Program is deemed of national interest, visa issuance may be recommended prior to completion of the screening. In such cases, however, post-arrival checks shall be made of State Department records and the screening completed after arrival. Copies of all waiver orders issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service pursuant to the foregoing are furnished to the U.S. Consular Officer or to the Visa Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Secret Service. Additionally, upon the arrival of each such alien, the INS at the port of entry promptly notifies the local office of the FBI.

Conditions imposed in waiver orders may include limitations as to the period of stay, may require the alien to adhere to the approved itinerary, and provide that no deviation from the approved itinerary or extension of period of stay be authorized without prior approval of the appropriate officials of the INS. These orders are subject to revocation at any time by INS. Inasmuch as these orders affect the

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duties and responsibilities of the agencies mentioned above, it is important that all conditions be clearly indicated on the orders and that any deviations from the approved itinerary or extensions of the period of stay be brought to the attention of the FBI and the Secret Service.

The composition of exchange groups under the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Program is sometimes changed by Communist-controlled governments so late as to unduly hasten or make impossible full security screening of newly added names. In cases where appropriate monitoring arrangements have been made and the scheduled departure date of a group would be imperiled by screening delay, there should be discretion to perform any necessary portion of the screening of such groups on a postcheck basis. If experience demonstrates that late changes are being made in order to circumvent full security screening, visas shall not be issued until screening has been accomplished.

## II. Soviet and Eastern European Commercial Visitors (BUSVIS)

Subsequent to the issuance of the June 5, 1969 report, there has been a vast increase in the number of commercial visitors to the United States from Communist-controlled countries. This resulted primarily from the execution of a number of U.S. trade agreements with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. With the increase, it was found that existing visa procedures for processing such visitors were inadequate.

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Consequently, new procedures were adopted by the Department of State in July, 1974, and are set forth in detail in Appendix I. They are implemented in full with respect to Soviets, and on a more liberal, reciprocal basis with Eastern European countries.

Generally, the revised procedures require more in-depth information in visa applications concerning such matters as the visitors' exact itineraries, the names and addresses of their employers, and the subject matter of their business in the U.S. Applications for Soviet visitors must be submitted two weeks in advance of issuance, for Eastern Europeans, three days, and the designation "BUSVIS" appears on the name check requests and the visas themselves. Other provisions include the maintenance of "alert lists" of U.S. installations or technologies sensitive for reasons of national security; travel controls; coordination among COMEX member agencies; extensions of stay; and periodic reporting on Soviet commercial visits by the Department of State.

Although the security measures recommended in this report apply to all nonimmigrant aliens from Communist-controlled countries, it will be noted that special emphasis has been placed on exchange and commercial visitors. Because of the unique procedures which have been established to handle these two classes of aliens, it is necessary they be given special and more detailed treatment.

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E. CONCLUSIONS

I. If comprehensive and clearly understood security principles and procedures applicable to all government agencies are adopted and enforced, it is possible to promote and expand the broad program of contacts with Communist-controlled countries in line with the Attorney General's memorandum of July 10, 1964, and the government's policy to promote travel to and from the USSR and Eastern Europe, and still provide for adequate security safeguards which will meet the varying needs of the concerned government agencies.

II. The orders entered under Section 212(d)(3) by the Immigration and Naturalization Service authorizing admission of nonimmigrant aliens from Communist-controlled countries clearly specify any special conditions imposed in such cases.

III. When deemed in the national interest in exceptional cases, and where appropriate monitoring arrangements have been made, the screening of members of an exchange group under the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Program and Eastern European commercial visitors may be made on a postcheck basis. In all such cases, however, pre-checks shall be made of State Department records.

PROVISION FOR REVIEW

The ICIS shall undertake a review of the procedures recommended herein whenever problems are raised by implementing agencies.

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REVISED USDS PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING OF SOVIET AND EASTERN  
EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL VISITS

1. Visa Application. The Department will instruct all posts abroad to require that Soviet and Eastern European visa applicants coming to the US on commercial visits provide the following supplementary information: profession, employer, business address and telephone, date of arrival, exact length of stay, nature of business, all institutions to be visited, addresses of the institutions and the names of a contact in each. This information would be included in the visa telegram. (In the case of Soviet commercial visitors applying in Moscow who list institutions located in areas closed to Soviet travel by the reciprocal travel controls, the MFA would be expected to forward a request for exceptions to the regulations\*) In the case of Eastern European visitors, a consular officer will have discretion to process those visa applications under existing procedures if he is satisfied that the visitor is coming to the US for purposes clearly of a non-sensitive nature. Consular officers will be provided with guidance for making this determination and will be required to apply the procedures outlined in paragraph 9 if there is any doubt as to the sensitive nature of the applicant's visit.

2. Transmission to Department. The Department will instruct all posts to use a designator when forwarding to the Department visa applications of Soviet or Eastern European commercial visitors. The designator will be "Busvis SOV" or "Busvis EE". The addresses can include DOD, Commerce, FBI and CIA; agencies choosing not to be included as addressees can arrange to have the cable in any reasonable quantity retransmitted electronically from the Department without appreciable delay.

3. Security Name Checks. Upon receipt of the visa cable, name checks will be initiated at the FBI and CIA. In the case of Soviet visitors, the Department has informally agreed with\* the security agencies that checks should be completed in time to permit visa issuance within three weeks\*\* of the date of

\* The requirement that MFA request closed area exceptions was subsequently dropped in 1975.

\*\* Reduced in 1976 to two weeks for most Soviet commercial visitors.

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application. If, for reasons which will be discussed later, the visa must be issued before the expiration of three weeks, the Department will telephone the security agencies for an informal concurrence or request to hold. If convincing evidence of intelligence affiliation or activity is revealed by the checks, visas will not be issued. In the case of Eastern European visitors, the name checks will ordinarily be completed on a post check basis unless the name appears in the Visa Look-out Book. The Eastern European policy will be open to revision for any particular country in case of demonstrated need (i.e., post checks revealing a significant number of security problems).

4. Itinerary. In the case of Soviet commercial visitors, EUR/SOV/ECON will telephone all firms listed in the visa application to confirm that they are expecting the visitors at the time and for the length of time proposed. The Department will honor the request of firms to refuse, postpone or shorten visits. If the firm requests that the visas be issued, SOV/ECON will remind the firm of the applicability of travel controls and of the Department of Commerce Export Control and Technical Data Regulations. The firm will then be asked to submit an itinerary of the visit more detailed than that provided by the visa application, including the exact dates of visits to specific plants and information about travel arrangements. (Obviously, in the case of inspectors or trainees who may, with visa extensions, be present in the country for periods up to eighteen months, the firm will not be able to produce an exact itinerary. However, it should indicate the general purpose of the visit and the range of travel anticipated.) A variation of this procedure occurs when one of the resident Soviet commercial organizations, such as Amtorg or the Kama Purchasing Commission, submit an itinerary; such an itinerary must be confirmed by the US companies, and the entire visa period accounted for by transactions with American companies. As a rule, the itinerary should be received in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs normally one week and at least three days before visa authorization.

5. "Alert List." The Department will invite all interested agencies to submit alert lists of installations sensitive for reasons of national security, and to establish a procedure for

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continuous updating of those lists. Any interested agencies may also provide "alert lists" for subjects within their competence. If the itinerary involves an installation or a subject designated as sensitive, the Department will place a temporary hold on visa issuance and will alert the COMEX to notify all relevant agencies. Action in terms of visa issuance or administration of the travel controls may be requested directly of EUR/SOV/ECON by an agency. Such action might include conditioning visa issuance or travel clearance upon the host firm's acceptance of extraordinary security measures. The Department's reply to such requests will be made after consultation with other relevant agencies and in conformity with guidelines established by inter-agency consultation.

6. Travel Controls. State, in consultation with the Department of Defense, wishes to assess the feasibility and/or suitability of unilaterally abolishing closed areas for Soviet businessmen (commercial visitors other than for personnel, temporary or permanent, of the Kama Purchasing Commission, the Amtorg Trading Corporation, and the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council). State would still require a full itinerary which would be provided to the FBI and COMEX in advance, travel requests would still be submitted at least two working days in advance, and approval for each trip would be subject to review. State would still consult DOD and other agencies concerned with internal security when requests were made to visit sensitive areas.

7. Interagency Liaison. Within a day of receipt in the office of Soviet Union Affairs, the more complete itinerary will be provided to the FBI and the COMEX. The COMEX will inform its member agencies of selected visits and relay intelligence opinions from those agencies to EUR/SOV/ECON. Commerce and DOD, routinely in receipt of all visa cables and of itinerary information on selected visits, would perform their own screening function and, within guidelines established by interagency consultation, take appropriate action to enforce regulations which they administer. If the visit involves an itinerary or transactions which are recognizably of interest to other State Department offices (including Munitions Control) or agencies not

members of the COMEX (Agriculture, Interior, etc.), they will be consulted directly by SOV/ECON.

8. Visa Office. An EUR clearance is provided to the Visa Office. The U.S. Visa issuance will be accomplished in a minimum of two weeks. Occasionally the period must be shortened at the request of an American host who has made complicated arrangements or incurred considerable expense in connection with the arrangements for a specific date. Upon receipt of the EUR clearance, the Visa Office initiates the State recommendation to Justice (INS) that a waiver of presumed ineligibility for a US visa be granted. (The ineligibility arises under the provisions of Section 212 (a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on account of Communist affiliation.) Upon receipt of the waiver, the Department (VO) authorizes the post abroad to issue the visa.

9. Eastern Europe.\* Items 4 - 8 apply only to Soviet visitors. Waivers of ineligibility are usually obtained by the East European diplomatic posts directly from INS in Vienna. A waiting period of three working days after dispatch of the Visa Information will be provided to permit interested agencies to react to the initial visa cable and to contact host firms. In the absence of objection, the visa will ordinarily be issued on the fourth working day or in time to meet the estimated date of departure, whichever comes later. In all cases, Commerce will satisfy itself that companies to be visited are fully cognizant of their statutory obligations under the terms of the Export Administration Act.

10. Itinerary Changes and Travel Controls on Resident Soviets.

The travel regulations require two working days notice for the travel of Soviet commercial officials and for Soviet trainees and inspectors stationed at host companies. Exceptions to the rule for timely notification of commercial visits will be granted only in cases of genuine emergency or visits to installations habitually visited by Soviets. Changes in the itinerary of short-term Soviet visitors are subject to the same time requirement and, in addition should be justifiable in terms of the original subject matter of the visit. Within a day of receipt in the Office

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\* Implementation of procedures in ICIS report will necessitate changes in these procedures.

of Soviet Union Affairs, the more complete itinerary will be provided to the FBI and the COMEX for selective dissemination to its member agencies. For use in processing these visits, the Department will apply the "alert" list of sensitive installations from any agency and will not approve the visit until that agency has been notified.

11. Report. EUR/SOV/ECON will prepare a periodic report on Soviet commercial visits.

12. Visa Extensions. When issued, the visas of Soviet and Eastern European visitors will be stamped "Busvis." The designator will alert the INS not to extend the visas without reference to the Department. For Soviet visitors the Department (EUR) will not authorize extensions until a new itinerary has been submitted and cleared in accordance with the procedure described above.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITERIA FOR  
REQUESTING VISA WAIVERS

The Department of State weighs numerous factors in determining when requests to the Immigration Service for visa waivers should be made. The principal criteria applied to each waiver case where the visa applicant is suspected of some connection with a Communist intelligence service are as follow:

1. Purpose of visit and its importance to the U.S.
2. Alien's current position in his country and role in programs of interest to the U.S.
3. Nature of the derogatory information (gravity, specificity, currency) and number and length of previous visits to U.S. without incident.
4. Proposed length of stay.
5. Proposed itinerary (extent, whether escorted by U.S. hosts).
6. U.S. vulnerability to reciprocal visa refusal.

Only after all these factors have been considered is a decision made on whether to request a waiver. When a waiver is requested, a full exposition of the elements in the decision is made in a letter for consideration by the Immigration Service.



U.S. PORTS OF ENTRY DESIGNATED FOR  
HOLDERS OF A, C-3, G, and B-1  
(in lieu of A)

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Laredo, Texas	-- (Road or Rail)
New York City	-- (Air or Sea)
Champlain, New York	-- (Road)
San Francisco, Calif.	-- (Air)
Washington, D.C., Dulles Airport	-- (Air)
Anchorage, Alaska	-- (Air transit only)
St. Albans, Vermont	-- (Rail)
Rouses Point, New York (Soviets only)	-- (Road)

May 25, 1977

REVISED UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING  
ALIENS VISITING THE UNITED STATES  
UNDER THE EXCHANGES PROGRAM

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Recognizing the desirability of bringing up to date their previous understanding on procedures to be used in protecting the national security of the US in connection with the stays in the US of aliens from the following countries:

the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR who are participants in the East-West Exchanges Program authorized by NSC 5607 of June 29, 1956, as reaffirmed Oct. 11, 1960; NSC 176 of March 1973; and NSC 215 of May 3, 1973; which authorized the US-USSR inter-governmental bilateral cooperative agreements in certain scientific fields; and by the 1973 General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Education, Cultural and Other Fields, signed by the US and the USSR in June 1973; the Department of State and the Department of Justice have agreed to the following:

Category 1 -- Delegations which visit the US under the exchanges programs authorized by NSC 5607, NSC 176, and NSC 215, wherein the subject matter, itinerary, and duration of stay have been determined by negotiation between the US and the USSR, or one of the other countries listed above (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR):

For such delegations, State will provide Justice expeditiously with such appropriate information on itinerary and nature of visit as it receives from the host agency or institution. Agencies administering these programs should give consideration to the desirability of having US

escort interpreters accompany delegations whenever possible.

Category 2 -- Persons traveling to the US to attend meetings or conferences for which USG is the host:

For the USSR visitors, State will request itinerary information from the USG agency concerned. The host agency should provide escorts and/or interpreters when it deems appropriate.

In the cases of visitors from the Eastern European countries specified above (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR), State will provide itinerary information at the time of or as soon as possible after visa issuance.

Category 3 -- Students, visiting professors, Fulbright lecturers, scientific researchers, and other academic and scientific personnel carrying out long-term studies, teaching or research in the US:

State, in the case of USSR visitors, will make an appropriate determination prior to visa issuance, to the end that the long-term stay of each individual at each institution is compatible with the national interest of the US. State will, in the case of visitors from the Eastern European countries specified above, make such a determination in those cases falling within the SPLEX category. Other Eastern European visitors will be processed in accordance with current US visa laws and regulations. State will prescribe rules and guidelines governing the travel of USSR visitors consistent with the aims and objectives of

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the exchanges programs authorized by NSC 5607, NSC 176, and NSC 215.

For visitors from the Eastern European countries specified above, State will prescribe rules and guidelines for travel.

Category 4 -- Persons traveling to the U.S. to conduct business and to engage directly in commercial activity:

For Soviet and Eastern European visitors, as applicable, State will request itinerary information from US host firms and will remind those firms of US Department of Commerce Export Control and Technical Data Regulations, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) under the Munitions Control Act. In conjunction with the Committee on Exchanges, the CIA, and the FBI, State will screen applications prior to visa issuance, both with regard to personal background and with regard to proposed activity. For Soviet visitors, State will also administer travel controls under the guidelines of its note of July 26, 1967 (as amended).

Category 5 -- Individuals or groups from the USSR coming to the US as tourists:

NSC 5607, p. 5, point number 11 specifically provides that tourism be considered an essential part of East-West exchanges; Article XIV of the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Education, Cultural and Other Fields, signed by the US and the USSR, June 19, 1973, continues this provision.

For group tourists coming from the USSR, State will request itineraries from the US travel

agency administering the tour, and will furnish that itinerary when received to Justice.

Category 6 -- Other Nonimmigrant Categories:

It is understood that there are visits to the US in furtherance of the objectives of the Exchanges Programs established by NSC 5607, and by NSC 176 and NSC 215, by persons in the professional, cultural, scientific, academic, and sports fields who are not classifiable under any of the above-listed categories. For such visitors, State will perform the customary screening prior to the issuance of visas, both with regard to personal background and with regard to proposed activity, and will appropriately consult and advise the organizers of such privately-sponsored events of the interests of the US. In such cases, as was true in the cases of group tourists falling into Category 5 above, INS will establish security safeguards appropriate in each individual case. State will also prescribe rules or guidelines where appropriate, governing the travel of each individual as provided under NSC 5607, but will apply no restrictions when US foreign policy dictates.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry

77-1658/1

FROM: Eloise R. Page  
Chief, Policy & Coordination Staff  
2D48, HQS.

EXTENSION

NO.

DD/O 77-5918/1

Justice  
20 June 77

DATE

10 August 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. O/DDO  
7E26, HQS.

10 AUG 1977

14 SEP 1977

The ICIS report has been reviewed by [redacted] EA and the CI Staff, [redacted] SE Divisions, without substantive comment. It does not impact on this Agency.

No DOI is necessary in that the Agency does not become involved with sponsoring visits of non-immigrant aliens from Communist-controlled countries, and the name trace procedures recommended by ICIS have been a part of the standard procedures for this Agency for some years.

For your information the ICIS report was coordinated in draft with the DDO by the Office of Security in early May.

Executive Secretary  
7E13, HQS.

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Justice

FORM

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